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I 
 
Introduction 
 
Stock market development has been an important part of financial liberalisation in the less developed 
countries (LDCs). In the pro-liberalisation circle, stock market is assigned to play an important role in the 
capitalist development of the LDCs. This is also true for the liberalisation regime of India. The people in 
India are encouraged to invest in stocks through income tax benefits and abolition of capital gains tax.  
There is a move to develop a national pension fund which will be invested in different stocks to get returns 
out of which pension will be provided to the retired people. It is expected that boosting up of stock market 
will accelerate the process of capital accumulation and growth. Rules and regulations are being changed to 
protect the interest of the share holders as shown by a recent leximetric study by the lawyers (Lele and 
Siems, 2006). 
 
There are many studies supporting the positive link between stock market development and growth. Let us 
mention some of the recent studies. One important study was undertaken by Levine and Zervos (1998). 
Their cross-country study found that the development of banks and stock markets has a positive effect on 
growth. In another study Levine (2003) argued that although theory provides ambiguous relationship 
between stock market liquidity and economic growth, the cross-country data for 49 countries over the 
period 1976-93 suggest a strong and positive relationship (see also Levine, 2001). Henry (2000) studied a 
sample of 11 LDCs and observed that stock market liberalisation leads to private investment boom. 
Recently, Bekaert et al (2005) analysed data of a large number of countries and observed that the stock 
market liberalisation ‘leads to an approximate 1 % increase in annual real per capita GDP growth’. 
 
With the recognition of the importance of stock market in economic development there is a call for a better 
protection of the interests of the shareholders. La Porta et al. (1998) observed that countries with a 
‘common law origin’ (such as UK) have a higher level of shareholder protection than countries with a civil 
law origin (such as France) and accordingly, the former group of countries has a lower concentration of 
stock ownership. In a subsequent paper (La Porta et al. 2005), the similar line of reasoning is used to 
explain a positive correlation between the level of shareholder protection and stock market developments. 
One of the underlying assumptions is that firm financing in the form of equity capital will be higher in 
countries with better shareholder protection.  
 
There are some economists who are sceptical. Long time back Keynes (1936) compared the stock market 
with casino and commented: ‘when the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of the 
activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done’. 
 
Referring to the study of World Bank (1993) Singh (1997) pointed out that stock markets have played little 
role in the post-war industrialisation of Japan, Korea and Taiwan.  He argued that the recent move towards 
stock market liberalisation is ‘unlikely to help in achieving quicker industrialisation and faster long-term 
economic growth’ in most of the LDCs. 
 
In this perspective we shall examine whether share market developments have any long-term relationship 
with capital accumulation and whether legal changes promoting the interest of the shareholders exerted any 
long-term effect on Indian share market developments (Section II). The concluding observations are made 
in the last section (Section III). 
 
 
  
II 
 
Capital Accumulation and Stock Market Changes: Long-term Relationships 
 
From Government of India (Economic Survey, 2005-6), data on gross private and public fixed capital 
formation as percentage of GDP (PVTGDP and PUBGDP, respectively) are available over the period 1950-
2004. PUBGDP showed a tendency to decline since the mid-1980s while PVTGDP accelerated indicating 
the start of the present regime with a declining importance of public sector much before the D-day of 
1991(Figure 1 and Table 1).  
 
From the on-line data source of IMF (International Financial Statistics) annual data (that smooth out short-
term volatility and seasonality) on stock (share) and wholesale price indices are collected over a long 
period, 1950-2005. These show that the growth in wholesale price index showed a steady growth since the 
mid-1950s while stock or share price index showed a sharp rise (sharper than price rise) since the mid-
1970s after a quarter century of very slow growth. The process slowed down in the 1990s. In real terms (i.e. 
the ratio of stock price to wholesale price), the share price declined till the mid-1970s and thereafter rose 
sharply amidst fluctuations till the early 1990s (Figure 2). The picture doesn’t change much if real share 
prices are derived by deflating the nominal share prices by the consumer price indexes.  
 
Regression analysis (without bothering for the tests of trend-stationarity for the time being) shows that the 
share price rose at a statistically significant rate of 9 percent per annum over the whole period 1950-2005; 
during 1950-75, the growth was not statistically significant but afterwards there was a rapid growth of 15 
percent per annum. In real terms there was no significant growth over the whole period; actually it declined 
at the rate of 4 percent during 1950-75 followed by a rise of around 9 percent per annum in the subsequent 
period (Table 1). 
 To ascertain whether share prices are trend-stationary or random walk with drift we have conducted 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Perron tests (in view of structural shifts), orders being chosen 
on the basis of the data-dependent General-to-Specific (GS) criterion (for details see Table 1 note 3) as 
advocated by Ng-Perron (1995) and Perron (1997). In no case can we reject the null hypothesis of unit root 
with drift.  
 
From the Financial Structure Dataset constructed by Thorsten Beck of World Bank (available on-line), a 
number of indicators of Indian stock market development are available over the period 1976-2005: average 
real stock market capitalisation relative to GDP (RMKAPGDP), total shares traded on the stock exchanges 
relative to GDP (VALTRDGDP) and the turnover ratio – the ratio of the value of total shares traded to 
average real market capitalization (TURN).1 Their log-values are plotted in Figure 3. It shows that stock 
market capitalisation (RMKAGDP) and the value of traded stocks (VALTRAD) rose over the whole period 
amidst much fluctuation since the early 1990s. The turnover ratio (TURN) showed a tendency to decline till 
the mid-1990s; thereafter it moved together with VALTRD – rising rapidly with a sharp fall in 2001. So the 
first two indicators show statistically significant trend growth and the turnover ratio shows no such trend 
growth. 
 
In the context of increasing concern for developments of stock market in the present regime of LPG 
(Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation), the question arises: is there any positive link between 
stock market developments and fixed capital formation.  We seek an answer to the question on the basis of 
available data. We have considered the different stock market variables and examine the relationship 
between each of these variables and private fixed capital formation over the period for which data are 
available.  We have left out the public fixed capital accumulation (PUBGDP) and so the total fixed capital 
formation (GKFGDP) for obvious reasons.    
 
We have used the Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1999). This technique can be used to test for the existence of a long run relationship 
between two variables irrespective of whether they are stationary or stochastic (having unit root). This 
approach is especially suitable here as the real and nominal share price series exhibit unit root processes 
while capital accumulation series is stationary. 
 
The ARDL equation fitted here is the following 
 
                                                                             m              n                                   
   (1)                                                        Yt = a + b.t + Σ  ci Yt-i + Σ dj Xt-j                                            
                                                                           i = 1         j = 0  
 
 
where Yt is the dependent variable – log of PVTGDP, Xt is the independent variable – the log of different 
share market variables such as SHARE, RSHARE, RMKAPGDP, VALTRADGDP and TURN, t is the 
time trend which captures the effect of other explanatory variables and m, n are unknown lags2 to be 
determined by the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) as suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999). 
 
The   long run coefficients estimated through the ARDL approach are reported in Table 2. These show no 
long-term relationship between (log values of) gross fixed private capital formation as percentage of GDP 
(LPVTGDP) and (log values of) nominal or real share price (LSHARE or LRSHARE). Nor do we get any 
long-term relationship between other share market development indicators and private fixed capital 
formation (PVTGDP). We have estimated a number of alternative ARDL equations by adding intercept 
and slope dummies for each of the periods 1985-2004 and 1991-2004 keeping in mind the two possible 
dates of regime change in favour of the present LPG regime.   In none of the cases we get a significant 
long-term relationship.  
 
In view of the fact that all the variables excepting share prices are found to be stationary we have used also 
the simple regression analysis (with due care to the problem of autocorrelation) and found no significant 
relationship between the share market variables and private capital formation (for share prices we have 
used the first log-difference and  all other variables are in level terms). 
 
 In the context of this observation of lack of relationship between share market variables and the very 
important factor behind the capitalist growth – fixed capital formation, we have studied the impact of 
changes in the relevant law on the development of share market. 
 
Changes in Shareholder Protection Laws and Stock Market Behaviour 
 
The Centre for Business Research (at Judge Business School, University of Cambridge) has produced a 
comprehensive time series dataset of shareholder protection for a number of countries including India. The 
coverage of the dataset is much more comprehensive than that of the LLSV index (La Porta et al, 1998).  It 
has been constructed by a team of legal scholars based on the “law on the books”. It takes into account 
company law, and some areas of securities law. There are 28 broad categories and altogether 60 legal 
variables (only 8 of these are very similar to those considered in the LLSV approach) relating to 
shareholder protection (details in Annexe I).  Each of the variables takes a value between 0 and 1, and 
many take intermediate values, since it was considered inaccurate and in many cases impossible to describe 
the level of a certain type of protection simply with a binary variable. A value of 1 relates to the highest 
level of protection and a 0 to the lowest, so if a country were to have the maximum level of protection, the 
indicators would sum up to 60.   
 
Out of the sixty legal variables considered, India experienced no change in 42 variables over the period of 
the study (1970-2005). Out of these 42 variables, 17 variables had the maximum possible value (= 1) and 
13 variables had the minimum value (= zero). The remaining 12 variables assumed some intermediate 
values. Only 18 (two of these are considered in the LLSV study) variables showed some variations – some 
variables (numbering 13, 21, 41, 47, 53) declined but the most (13 variables) increased between the two 
dates 1970 and 2005(Table 3). By 2001, 23 variables attained the level of perfection (assuming the value 1) 
and another 10 variables reached close to perfection (assuming the value close to 0.8). 
 
The over-all picture is that the shareholders protection level (unweighted3 average of the sixty variables) 
increased slightly in the 1970s and the 1980s: it rose from 0.47 during 1970-74 to 0.49 during 1975-84, to 
0.5 during 1985-89. Major changes took place in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s: the average index 
rose to 0.54 during 1990-99 and finally to 0.61 during 2000-5.  The behaviour of the average of all the 60 
variables (hereafter CBR60) along with the average of those 18 variables (out of 60) that actually varied 
during 1970-2005 ((hereafter CBR18) and the average LLSV index4 is shown in Figure 4.  Regression 
analysis of CBR60 and CBR18 index showed that these had statistically significant rising trends (Table 1).  
 
Does the change in legal variable influence developments in the stock market?  La Porta et al (2005) 
argued in favour of a positive influence of the shareholder protection on stock market developments (see 
also Beck et al., 2003).  In the Indian context we seek an answer to this question on the basis of the ARDL 
approach. In no case do we get a positive long-term relationship between the share market development 
indicators (chosen one at a time) and the legal variable – CBR60 or CBR18 (Table 4). Rather the legal 
variable has a negative relationship with the value of trade and perhaps with the turnover ratio. It could be 
the result of the bubble of 2001. So we tried spike dummy for 2001 and got no long-term relationship 
instead of the negative relationship. 
 
III 
 
Concluding observations 
 
The avowed objective of government concern for a proper legal environment in the stock market is 
promotion of growth through capital formation. This is particularly true in a less developed country such as 
India especially in a liberalisation regime with more and more reliance on private sector (rather than public 
sector) for economic development. In this context we have examined the long-term relationship between 
private fixed capital formation and different stock market variables. For nominal and real share price we 
have data for more than half a century. Over that period (1950-2004), private fixed capital formation has no 
relationship with the share price movements. Rising share prices are hailed in some circles including Indian 
Finance Ministry as the sign of booming economy and the success of the LPG regime. But the mechanism 
through which it signals boom is unclear so far as the real economic growth is concerned. 
 
The conclusion of no relationship can also be found if we use the other more recognised indicators of stock 
market development such as real market capitalisation and value of trade (both in relations to GDP) and the 
turnover ratio over a shorter period, 1976-2004. 
 
This finding supports our earlier conclusion (Sarkar, 2006). Our earlier analysis of a sample of 31 less 
developed countries shows that the cross-country variations in stock market capitalization as a percentage 
of GDP- an important indicator   of stock market development- do not explain the cross-country variations 
in the growth rates of gross fixed capital formation.  Time series analysis of individual country cases shows 
that in the majority of cases (including India) there exist no meaningful relationship between stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP and growth of gross fixed capital formation. Thus both of our studies 
discount the importance of stock market development in promoting industrial growth through capital 
accumulation in less developed countries such as India. Hence the concern for better corporate governance 
for protection of the interests of the shareholders   is misplaced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
END NOTES 
 
1 In the Financial Structure Dataset constructed by Thorsten Beck of World Bank, the following 
definitions are used: 
  
MKAPGDP: Value of listed shares to   GDP is  calculated using the following deflation  
method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is stock market capitalization, 
P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a  is average annual CPI; 
 
        VALTRDGDP: Total shares traded on the stock market exchange to GDP; 
           
              TURNOVER: Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. It 
is calculated using the following method:  Tt/P_at/{(0.5)*[Mt/P_et+ Mt-1/P_et-1] where T is 
total value traded, M is stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI,  P_a is average 
annual CPI. 
 
2 The choice of the maximum lag-length is limited by the availability of data. For 1950-2004, 
we used maximum 10 lags; for 1976-2004, we could use 8 lags.  Using SBC, the optimum lag 
structure is chosen out of the maximum lags considered.  
3 It is difficult to give weights to different indices to derive the composite index. Instead of 
giving arbitrary weights, we have given equal weight to each index. It implies all the sixty 
legal variables are equally important for shareholder protection. 
4 Based on Lele and Siems (2006) coding of the original LLSV variables.  
 
                         
                      
 
Table 1: India’s Capital Accumulation, Stock Market Developments and Shareholder Protection  
Law Indices: Trends1 since 1950 
 
Dependent 
Variables2/ 
Period  & 
Process 
Intercept Time Intercept 
Dummy 
Slope 
Dummy 
Adj. 
R Sq. 
 
D-W 
Stat. 
ADF 
Stat. 3 
Gross Private 
Fixed Capital 
Formation-GDP 
Ratio(LPVTGDP) 
1950-2004 
       
AR (1) 1.7** 0.02**   0.96 1.58 -3.612(0)$ 
AR(2) 1.8** 0.02** -0.38** 0.01** 0.97 2.08  
Gross Public 
Fixed Capital 
Formation-GDP 
Ratio(LPUBGDP) 
1950-2004 
       
AR (1) 1.79** 0.004   0.81 1.8 -3.692(0) £ 
AR (2) 0.86** 0.04** 2.56** -0.07** 0.89 1.71  
Nominal Share 
Price (LSHARE) 
1950-2005 
       
AR (1) -0.31 0.09**   0.99 1.74 -1.371(0) 
AR (1) 0.27 
 
0.01 -3.96** 0.15** 0.99 1.85 -2.306 (0) 
 
Real Share Price 
(LRSHARE) 
 1950-2005 
       
AR (1) 2.95** 0.03   0.93 1.77 -0.952(0) 
AR (1) 3.67** -0.04** -3.43** 0.13** 0.94 1.83 -2.805(0) 
Real Stock Market 
Capitalisation to 
GDP 
(LRMKAPGDP)  
1976-2005 
       
AR (1) -7.22** 0.12**   0.95 1.89 -2.489(11) $ 
Total Shares 
Traded to GDP 
( VALTRDGDP) 
1976-2005   
       
AR (1) -8.29** 0.14**   0.72 1.99 -5.404(0) $ 
Turnover Ratio 
  (LTURN) 
1976-2005 
       
OLS -0.95 0.01   -0.01 1.88 -4.9141(0) $ 
OLS -0.41**     0.00 1.84 -4.842(0) £ 
 
 
       
Share Holder 
Protection Law 
(CBR60) 
1970-2005 
AR (1) 0.38** 0.004**   0.92 1.86 -2.318(0) $ 
Share Holder 
Protection Law 
(CBR18) 
1970-2005 
       
AR (1) -0.07 0.01**   0.92 1.86 -2.318(0) $ 
 
1 The fitted equation is: 
Y = a + b.t  
where Y is the dependent variable, t = time. 
In the appropriate cases this linear trend equation is re-estimated with intercept and slope dummies 
(D and SD respectively). For LSHARE and LRSHARE, D= 0 for 1950-75 and = 1 for the rest. For 
LPVTGDP and LPUBGDP, D= 0 for 1950-85 and =1 for the rest.  SD = t.D 
 
Initially the regression equations are fitted through the ordinary least square (OLS) technique. A 
twelve-order Lagrange Multiplier test is conducted to ascertain the lag structure of the 
autoregressive (AR) error process and the parameters and their t-values are re-estimated (as 
needed) through the maximum likelihood process. 
 
2 Excepting the legal index all other dependent variables are log-values. 
 
3 The tests are based on OLS. To correct for our small sample, the Boot-strapping method 
(1000 simulations) is used for testing the unit root hypothesis (through the EASYREG 
programme). The data-dependent General-to-specific (GS) criterion is used to choose the optimum 
lag structure of the error process of the Dickey-Fuller equation as advocated by Ng-Perron (1995) 
and Perron (1997). Under this process, the specific order is chosen out of the general order (we 
considered here 12 lags) on the basis of the standard t-tests of significance of the lag terms. If out 
of 12 lag terms considered here,  the 8th lag (say) term is statistically significant but all higher 
order lag terms are insignificant we run an 8th order ADF equation and check whether 8th order lag 
is significant. If now (say) the 6th order lag term is significant but the higher order lag terms are 
insignificant, we fit a 6th order ADF equation and check the maximum order significant lag terms. 
If the 6th order lag term is significant the appropriate ADF model is taken to be 6th order. If not, the 
process continues until we arrive at the zero-order ADF (i.e. DF) equation. 
*     Significant at 5 per cent level. 
               **   Significant at 1 per cent level. 
$     The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 5 per cent level (based on 1000     simulations 
through the boot-strapping method). 
£     The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 5 per cent level (based on 1000     simulations 
through the boot-strapping method). In view of the insignificant time trend, it is dropped so that 
the alternative hypothesis accepted is mean-stationarity. 
#    The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 10 per cent level (based on 1000     simulations 
through the boot-strapping method). 
 
 Table 2: Capital Formation and Stock Market Developments: Estimates of Long-term 
Relationships through ARDL Method1  
 
Independent 
Variable (Xt)/ Period 
(Model) 
Private Fixed Capital Formation,  
LPVTGDP (Yt) 
(ARDL Model in parentheses) 
         (a)                         (b)                            (c)                       
Nominal Share Price 
(LSHARE)  
1950-2004 
0.06 
(1,0) 
-0.04 
(1,0) 
0.01 
(1,0) 
 
 
Real Share Price 
(LRSHARE) 
 1950-2004 
0.06 
(1,0) 
-0.06 
(1,0) 
0.01 
(1,0) 
 
 
  
Real Stock Market 
Capitalisation to 
GDP 
(LRMKAPGDP),  
1976-2004 
0.05 
(0,0) 
-0.09 
(0,5) 
-0.01 
(0,0) 
 
 
Total Shares Traded 
to GDP 
(LVALTRDGDP), 
1976-2004   
-0.002 
(0,0) 
-0.003 
(0,0) 
-0.005 
(0,0) 
 
 
Turnover Ratio 
(LTURN), 
1976-2004 
-0.01 
(0,0) 
-0.01 
(0,0) 
-0.004 
(0,0) 
 
 
  
 
  
1          The fitted equation is 
 
                                                                            m              n                                   
                                                               Yt = a + b.t + Σ  ci Yt-i + Σ dj Xt-j                                            
                                                                           i = 1         j = 0  
 
 
where Yt is the dependent variable – the share of gross private fixed capital formation in GDP– log values 
(LPVTGDP) in period t, Xt is the log values of different stock market variables (LSHARE, LRSHARE, 
LRMKAPGDP, LVALTRDGDP and LTURN) and m, n are unknown lags determined by the Schwarz 
Bayesian criterion (SBC). 
 In column (a), the estimates of long-run coefficients of Yt are presented by fitting the original equation 
through the ARDL method (with the aid of the Microfit 4.1 programme).  In column (b), the coefficients 
are estimated after adding intercept and slope dummies for the period 1985-04 to the original equation. In 
column (c), the coefficients are estimated after adding intercept and slope dummies for the period 1991-04 
to the original equation.  
 
 
Table 3: India’s Shareholder Protection Law: Changes during 1970-20051 
  
NO. 
Broad Categories  
Changes  
 I. Powers of the general meeting [0.61]  
1  No Change(1) 
2  No Change(1) 
3  No Change(0.5) 
4  No Change(0.25) 
5  No Change(0.5) 
6  No Change(1) 
7  No Change(0) 
 II. Agenda setting power[0.29]  
8  No Change(0) 
9 
 Declined from 1 to 0.75 in 1988; 
slightly improved to 0.8 in 
2001(0.88) 
10  No Change(0) 
 III. Extraordinary shareholder meeting[0.75]  
11*  No Change(0.5) 
12  No Change(1) 
 IV. Anticipation of shareholder decision[0.26]  
13 
 Declined  from 0.5 to 0.38 in 1988 
(0.44) 
14* 
 Improved in 1985 from 0 to 0.5 and 
further to 0.88 in 2001(0.35) 
15  No Change(0) 
   
V. Information in the run-up of the general meeting 
[0.88] 
16  No Change(0.75) 
17  No Change(1) 
18* VI. Shares not blocked before general meeting [1] No Change(1) 
 VII. Individual information rights [0]  
19  No Change(0) 
20  No Change(0) 
 VIII. Communication with other shareholders[0.94]  
21 
 Improved in 1975 from 0.75 to 1 and 
worsened to 0.5 in 2000(0.88) 
22  No Change(1) 
 IX. Board composition [0.13]  
23  Improved from 0 to 1 in 2000(0.14) 
24 
 Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 1998 and 
further to 0.75 in 2001(0.12) 
25 
 Improved from 0 to 0.34 in 2000, 
further to 0.75 in 2001 and further to 
0.888 in 2002(0.13) 
 
X. No excessive remuneration for non-executive and 
executive directors[0.78]  
26  No Change(1) 
27 
 Improved from 0.25 to 1 in 
2001(0.35) 
28  No Change(1) 
29 XI. Performance based remuneration [0.5] Improved from 0 to 1 in 1988(0.5) 
   
XII. Duration of director’s appointment 
[0.38] 
30  No Change(0) 
31  No Change(0.75) 
 XIII. Directors’ duties [0.75]  
32  No Change(0.75) 
33  No Change(1) 
34  No Change(0.5) 
 XIV. Shareholder supremacy [0.47]  
35  No Change(0.5) 
36  Improved from 0 to 1 in 1990(0.44) 
37* XV. Pre-emptive rights [1] No Change(1) 
38 XVI. Director’s disqualification [0.08] Improved from 0 to 0.5 in 2000(0.83) 
39 
XVII. Corporate governance code [0.16] 
 
Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 1998 and 
further to 1 in 2001(0.16) 
 XVIII. Public enforcement of company law[0.84]  
40  Improved from 0.5 to 1 in 1975(0.93) 
41 
 Improved from 0.75 to 1 and 
worsened to 0.25 in 1988(0.59) 
42  No Change(1) 
43 XIX. Quorum [0] No Change(0) 
44 XX. Supermajority requirements [1] No Change(1) 
 XXI. One share – one vote[0.85]  
45*  No Change(1) 
46  No Change(1) 
47 
 Worsened from 0.67 to 0 in 2000 
(0.56) 
48* 
XXII. Cumulative voting [0.03] Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 2001 
(0.03) 
49 
XXIII. Voting by interested shareholders prohibited 
[0] No Change(0) 
50 XXIV. No squeeze out (freeze out) [0] No Change(0) 
 XXV. Right to exit [0.11]  
51*  No Change(0) 
52  No Change(0) 
53 
 Improved from 0 to 1 in 1990 and 
worsened to 0.5 in 1997 (0.32) 
54 
XVI. Disclosure of major share ownership [0.36] Improved from 0 to 0.25 in 1986 and 
further to 0.75 in 1990 (0.36) 
 XXVII. Oppressed minority [0.75]  
55  No Change(0.75) 
56*  No Change(0.75) 
 XXVIII. Shareholder protection is mandatory [0.63]  
57  No Change(1) 
58  No Change(1) 
59  No Change(0) 
60  No Change(0.5) 
 
ALL (1 to 60) [0.52] It rose from 0.47 during 1970-74 to 
0.49 during 1975-84, to 0.5 during 
1985-89, to 0.54 during 1990-99 and 
finally to 0.61 during 2000-5. 
1 Indices  averaged over 1970-2005 in parentheses (maximum value is 1  
and the minimum is 0). 
      * Lele and Siems (2006) identified that these variables constituted the original LLSV index. 
                                        Source: Lele and Siems (2006).
Table 4: Shareholder Protection Law and Stock Market Developments:  
Estimates of the Long-run Coefficients through ARDL Method1, 1970-2005 
 
Dependent Variable(Yt)/ 
Period 
 
ARDL 
Model 
Share Holder Protection Law-CBR60 
(Xt): Long-run coefficients 
Nominal Share Price 
(LSHARE)  
1970-20052 
(1,0) 0.28 
Real Share Price 
(LRSHARE) 
 1970-20052 
(1,0) -1.44 
Real Stock Market 
Capitalisation  to GDP 
(LRMKAPGDP),  
1976-2005 
( 6,6 ) -126.06 
Total Shares Traded to 
GDP   ( LVALTRDGDP), 
1976-2005   
( 0,1) -17.77* 
Turnover Ratio (LTURN), 
1976-20053 
(0,1 ) -13.8 
 
*    Significant at 5 per cent level. 
 
1          The fitted ARDL (m, n) equation is 
 
m              n 
Yt = a + b.t + Σ  ci Yt-i + Σ dj Xt-j 
i = 1         j = 0 
 
 
where  Xt  is the independent variable – legal index (CBR60 or CBR18), Yt is the dependent variable - the 
log of  different share market variables such as SHARE, LSHARE, RMKAPGDP, VALTRDGDP, TURN,  
t is the time trend which captures the effect of other explanatory variables and m, n are unknown lags 
determined by the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) as suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999).  We have 
reported only the estimates relating to CBR60 as estimates relating to CBR18 do not tell a different story. 
2 In view of structural changes in the share prices since 1975 (possibly unrelated to law changes), 
intercept and slope dummies are added to the original equation to re-estimate the long-term coefficients but 
the basic conclusion remains. 
3 In view of trendlessness of TURN, the ARDL model is fitted without time trend.  The negative 
long-run coefficient is marginally significant at 5.1 per cent level.  
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 Annex 1:   Shareholder Protection Law Indices  
Broad Categories Procedures of Construction   of the Sixty Indices 
 
I. Powers of the 
general meeting 
 
The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of the general meeting and 1 
if there is a power of the general meeting. 
(1) Amendments of articles of association;  
(2) Mergers and divisions; 
(3) Capital measures; 
(4) De facto changes: The decisive thresholds are the sale of 50 and 80 %  
of the assets; i.e.. if the sale of more than 50 % requires approval of the 
general meeting it equals 1; if more than 80 % it equals 0.5; 
otherwise 0;  
(5) Dividend distributions: Equals 1 if the general meeting can effectively 
influence the amount of dividend (i.e.. if it decides about the annual 
accounts and the annual dividend and if the board has no significant 
possibility of ‘manipulating’ the accounts); equals 0.5 if there is some 
participation of the general meeting; equals 0 if it is only the board that 
decides about the dividend; 
(6) General election of board of directors; 
(7) Directors’ self-dealing of substantial transactions. 
 
II. Agenda setting 
power 
 
 
8) General topics: Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less 
of the capital can put an item on the agenda; equals 0.5 if there 
is a hurdle of more than 1 % but less than 10 %; equals 0 
otherwise. 
9) Election of directors: ditto  
10) Costs: Equals 1 if shareholders do not have to pay for their 
proposals; equals 0 otherwise. 
III. Extraordinary 
shareholder 
meeting 
11) Right: Equals 1 if the minimum percentage of share capital to 
demand an extraordinary meeting is less than or equal to 5 %; equals 0.5 if 
it is more than 5 % but less or equal than 10 %; equals 0 otherwise. 
12) Enforcement: Equals 1 if shareholders can call the meeting 
themselves or have a right that the court will enforce it; equals 0 if the court 
has discretion. 
IV. Anticipation of 
shareholder 
decision 
13) Restrictions on proxy voting: Equals 0 if there are restrictions 
on who can be appointed or which rights the proxy has so that it is likely 
that proxy voting does usually not take place; equals 0.5 if there are some 
restrictions which reduce the relevance of proxy voting; equals 1 if there are 
no restrictions. 
14) Anticipation facilitated: Equals 1 if postal voting or proxy 
solicitation with two-way voting proxy form has to be provided by the 
company; equals 0.5 if two-way proxy form has to be provided but not 
proxy solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 
15) Costs of proxy contest: Equals 1 if the costs of proxy 
solicitations are paid by the company or if proxies have the right to have 
their proposals included in the company’s proxy form; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
V. Information in 
the run-up of the 
general meeting 
16 Amendments of the articles of association: Equals 1 if 
the exact wording has to be sent in advance (‘push-system’); equals 0.5 if 
the shareholders have to request it (‘pull-system’); equals 0 otherwise. 
17 Mergers: Equals 1 if a special report has to be sent in 
advance (‘push-system’); equals 0.5 if the shareholders have to request it 
(‘pull-system’); equals 0 otherwise. 
 
VI. Shares not 
blocked before 
general meeting 
18) Equals 0 if the shareholders have to deposit their shares prior to the 
general meeting and if this has the consequence that the shareholders are 
prevented from selling their shares for a number of days; equal 1 otherwise. 
 
VII. Individual 
information rights 
19) Right to demand information (a): equals 1 if an individual shareholder 
or shareholders with 5 % or less capital can demand information which 
will be answered at the general meeting; equals 0.5 if shareholders with 
10% or less capital have this right; equals 0 otherwise. 
20) Right to demand information (b): equals 1 if an individual shareholder 
or shareholders with 5 % or less capital can demand information 
independent of the general meeting; equals 0.5 if shareholders with 
10% or less capital have this right; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
VIII. Commu-
nication with other 
shareholders 
21) Right to access the register of shareholders and (if necessary) beneficial 
owners: Equals 1 if the right of inspection can be used by a single 
shareholder; equals 0 if there is no such right. 
22) Equals 1 if communication is not affected by proxy rules; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 
IX. Board 
composition 
 
23) Division between management and control: Equals 1 if there is a two-
tier system or at least half of the board members are non-executive; 
equals 0.5 if at least 25% of the board members are non-executive; 
equals 0 otherwise. 
24) Independent board members: Equals 1 if at least half of the board 
members must be independent; equals 0.5 if at least 25 % of them must 
be independent or if the independence requirement is very low; equals 0 
otherwise. 
25) Committees: Equals 1 if companies have to install an audit and a 
remuneration committee with a majority of independent members; 
intermediate scores are possible if the requirement is partial (for 
instance if it requires setting up of one of the committees or the 
independent members of the committees constituting  less than a 
majority); equals 0 if committees are not necessary. 
 
X. No excessive 
remuneration for 
non-executive and 
executive  
Directors 
26) General meeting power: Equals 1 if the general meeting has to approve 
all compensation schemes; equals 0.5 if this is limited (e.g. applies to 
stock option plans only or if some directors are excluded); equals 0 
otherwise. 
27) Annual disclosure: Equals 1 if there is full and specific disclosure about 
the individual remuneration of each director; equals 0.75 if there is 
information about the individual remuneration of some directors; equals 
0.5 if there is disclosure about the top 2 directors (executives); equals 
0.25 if there is only disclosure about the overall remuneration; equals 0 
otherwise. 
28) Substantive requirements placing limit for remuneration in order to 
protect shareholders: Equals 1 if there is a direct regulation; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
XI. Performance 
based remuneration 
 
29) Equals 1 if performance based remuneration of directors and managers is 
fostered; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
XII. Duration of 
director’s 
30) Normal duration: Equals 1 if this is one year or less; 0 if this is five 
years or more; equals 0.5 if this is more than 1 but less than 5 years. 
appointment 31) Dismissal feasible: Equals 1 if there are no special requirements; equals 
0 if an important reason is required; equals 0.5 if there are no special 
requirements but directors can claim for compensation. 
 
XIII. Directors 
duties 
 
32) Directors’ liability - duty of care: Equals 0 if there are narrow criteria 
which virtually exclude liability; equals 0.5 if there are some 
restrictions (e.g. business judgement rule; gross negligence); equals 1 if 
there are no or little restrictions (regarding business judgement and 
standard of care). 
33) Directors’ liability - duty of loyalty: Equals 1 if there is a duty not to 
put personal interests ahead of the company; equals 0 otherwise. 
34) Private enforcement (derivative suit shareholder action): Equals 0 if this 
is typically excluded (e.g. because of strict subsidiarity requirement 
hurdle - which is at least 10 %); equals 0.5 if there are some restrictions 
{e.g. certain percentage of share capital (less than 10 %); equals 1 
otherwise. 
 
XIV. Shareholder 
supremacy 
35) General principle: Equals 1 if the board always has to give priority to 
shareholders interests; equals 0 if the board have to give priority to the 
interests of other stakeholders; equals 0.5 in other cases. 
36) Takeover law: Equals 1 if there is the principle of strict neutrality in 
case of takeovers; equals 0.5 if the principle of neutrality is subject to 
exceptions; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
XV. Pre-emptive 
rights 
37) Equals 1 when the law grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new 
issues of shares, and this right can be waived only by the general meeting; equals 
0 otherwise. 
 
XVI. Director’s 
disqualification 
38)Equals 1 if negligent conduct can lead to disqualification; 0.5 if only in 
specific instances of negligence the directors are disqualified (e.g.. failure of 
financial reporting); equals 0 otherwise. 
 
XVII. Corporate 
governance code 
 
39) Equals 1 if companies have to disclose and explain whether they comply 
with a corporate governance code; equals 0.5 if this is only recommended; 
equals 0 otherwise. 
 
XVIII. Public 
enforcement of 
company law 
The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of public authority and 1 if 
public authority has power. 
40) Authorisation for director’s self dealing of substantial transactions. 
41) Authorisation for appointment of managers. 
42) Power to intervene generally in cases of oppression of shareholders or 
mismanagement of company. 
 
 
 
XIX. Quorum 43) Equals 1 if there is a 50 % quorum for the extraordinary shareholder meeting 
(at least if it is called for the first time); equals 0.5 if the quorum is 1/3; equals 
1/4 if the quorum is 1/4. Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
XX. Supermajority 
requirements  
44) Equals 1 if there are supermajority requirements (e.g. 2/3 or 3/4) for 
amendments of the articles of association, mergers and voluntary liquidations; 
equals 0 if they do not exist at all. 
 
XXI. One share – 
one vote 
45) Default rule: Equals 1 if this principle exists as a default rule; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 46) Prohibition of multiple voting rights (super voting rights): Equals 1 if 
there is a prohibition; equals 2/3 if only companies which already have 
multiple voting rights can keep them; equals 1/3 if state approval is 
necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 
47) Prohibition of capped voting rights (voting right ceilings): Equals 1 if 
there is a prohibition; equals 2/3 if only companies which already have 
voting caps can keep them; equals 1/3 if state approval is necessary; 
equals 0 otherwise. 
  
 
XXII. Cumulative 
voting 
48) Equals 1 if the law allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one 
candidate standing for election to the board of directors or if the law allows a 
mechanism of proportional representation in the board by which minority 
interests may name a proportional number of directors to the board; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 
XXIII. Voting by 
interested 
shareholders 
prohibited 
 
49) Equals 1 if a shareholder cannot vote if this vote favours him or her 
personally (i.e. only ‘disinterested shareholders’ can vote); equals 0 otherwise. 
XXIV. No squeeze 
out (freeze out) 
 
50) Equals 0 if a shareholder holding 90 % or more can ‘squeeze out’ the 
minority; equals 1 otherwise. 
 
 
XXV. Right to exit 51) Appraisal rights: Equals 1 if they exist for mergers amendments of the 
articles and sales of major company assets; equals 0 if they do not exist 
at all. 
52) Mandatory bid: Equals 1 if there is a mandatory bid for the entirety of 
shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0 
otherwise. 
53) Mandatory public offer: Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public offer 
for purchase of 10% or less of the shares; equals 0.5 if the acquirer has 
to make a mandatory public offer for acquiring more than 10% of the 
shares; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
XVI. Disclosure of 
major share 
ownership 
54) Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the companies capital 
have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 if 
this concerns 10 %; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise. 
XXVII. Oppressed 
minority 
55) Substantive law: Equals 0 if majority decisions of the general meeting 
have to be accepted by the outvoted minority; equals 1 if some kind of 
substantive control is possible (e.g. in cases of amendments to the 
articles of association, ratification of management misconduct, 
exclusion of the pre-emption right related parties transactions, freeze 
outs); equals 0.5 if this control covers only flagrant abuses of majority 
power. 
56) Shareholder action: Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim 
against a resolution by the general meeting because he or she regards it 
as void or voidable; equals 0.5 if there are hurdles such as a threshold 
of at least 10 % voting rights or cost rules; equals 0 if this kind of 
shareholder action does not exist. 
 
XXVIII. 
Shareholder 
protection is 
57) Exclusion of directors’ duty of care in articles: equals 0 if possible and 
equals 1 otherwise. 
58) Rules on duration of director’s appointment: equals 1 if mandatory and 
mandatory  
 
0 otherwise. 
59) Board composition (supervisory boards. non-executive directors): 
equals 1 if mandatory and 0 otherwise. 
60) Other topics: equals 1 if there is the general rule that company law is 
mandatory; equals 0 if company law is in general just a ‘model off the 
shelf’; equals 0.5 if there is no general rule. 
 
 
Source:  Lele and Siems (2006). 
 
 
